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Abstract
The continued integration of technology into all
aspects of society stresses the need to identify and
understand the risk associated with assimilating new
technologies. This necessity is heightened when
technology is used for medical purposes like
ambulatory devices that monitor a patient’s vital signs.
This integration creates environments that are
conducive to malicious activities. The potential impact
presents new challenges for the medical community.
Hence, this research presents attack graph
modeling as a viable solution to identifying
vulnerabilities, assessing risk, and forming mitigation
strategies to defend ambulatory medical devices from
attackers. Common and frequent vulnerabilities and
attack strategies related to the various aspects of
ambulatory devices, including Bluetooth enabled
sensors and Android applications are identified in the
literature. Based on this analysis, this research
presents an attack graph modeling example on a
theoretical device that highlights vulnerabilities and
mitigation strategies to consider when designing
ambulatory devices with similar components.

1. Introduction
The assimilation of technology into medical related
devices is continuing to escalate in today’s networked
environments. This integration is blatantly visible in
Ambulatory Medical Devices (AMDs) and Implantable
Medical Devices (IMDs). Patients are able to wear
AMDs that can monitor Electrocardiogram (EKG) data
to detect arrhythmia, monitor blood glucose levels,
administer insulin, and wear pulse oximeters that
continuously monitors blood oxygen saturation in real
time [40, 55, 56]. Not only does this emerging frontier,
potentially, improve the safety and well-being of
patients; it also provides a continuous source of data
for healthcare practitioners to utilize when they are
studying associated disorders.
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IMDs, such as infusion pumps, dispense controlled
volumes of a drug (e.g. insulin or pain medicine) when
it is required by the patient. These implantable drugdelivery systems provide a viable method for achieving
remedial drug concentrations in order to enhance
patient welfare throughout treatment [23]. Another
type of implantable medical device is a pacemaker.
Pacemakers are placed under the skin near the heart to
stimulate heartbeats [2].
The continued integration of technology into
medical devices stresses the need to identify and
understand the risk associated with assimilating new
technologies. Not only do AMDs and IMDs present a
physiological risk to the patients who use the device,
but it also presents liability risk to practitioners and
businesses who are monitoring and interpreting the
data produced by these devices [36]. Environmental
issues that increase the risks associated with AMDs
and IMDs, when compared to traditional medical
devices include accessibility and data transmission
modes but these devices are accessible by the patient
and the general population while they are in use in
everyday activities. In other words, there is no physical
tampering restriction imposed by the medical provider,
like hospital staff, when these devices are used.
From a data transmission perspective, most
communication to and from the device is achieved via
a wireless connection by a practitioner who may or
may not be in the same location as the device. The type
of transmission will vary depending on the solution
implemented by the device manufacturer. Some
ambulatory devices require a period of data storage,
followed by a data upload, while other devices feed a
constant stream of data to a storage device while it is in
use [44, 50, 51]. These characteristics present
opportunities to attackers that are not present in
traditional medical devices. Therefore, ambulatory
devices should be assessed and modeled independently
of the traditional devices and traditional risk models.
From a risk perspective, many risk models have
been proposed, investigated and implemented into the
health care industry. A few of the traditional models
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that are commonly discussed include: Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [4], A Risk Management
Capability Model for Use in Medical Device
Companies [46], and CORAS [43]. However, these
models fail to provide concise insight into AMD
susceptibility.
The reality is that coupling environmental variable
with multiple impact targets creates environments for
AMDs and IMDs that entice plausible malicious
activities in the areas of data exfiltration, data
manipulation, and/or device operation modifications.
Hence, this research focuses on adversaries who
intentionally attempt to gain unauthorized access to a
device for nefarious reasons. In doing so, this research
investigates the implementation and use of attack
graphs as a viable vehicle for investigating this risk
associated with AMDs.
Attack graphs are representations that provide a
means of analyzing the susceptibility of a system.
These graphs present vulnerabilities, exploits, and
conditions for multiple attacks in a single consolidated
model that allows for a quantitative examination of
each individual attack [7]. A benefit of a graph based
model is that it presents a rich view of how
vulnerabilities relate to each other.
This paper is organized as follows: Section two
investigates the current use of ambulatory devices, as
well as their vulnerabilities, risk models, and
mitigation strategies. The review of the literature also
examines the state of the art in attack graphs and graph
modeling. Section three discusses the data sets used for
the analysis and section four presents the construction
of attack graphs and identification of mitigation
strategies. Section five elicits conclusions from the
analysis and presents future work.

2. Relevant Work
The continued integration of technology into the
medical arena has fueled research interest in industry
and academia. As this proliferation continues, it can be
reasoned that the amount of risk increases due to an
increasing attack surface and the introduction of new
technology. Recent research indicates that residual data
extracted from mobile devices is having an increasing
impact in legal environments [3, 16]. The escalating
amalgamation of ambulatory medical devices into the
healthcare industry forces a need to understand the risk
that these devices present to organizations.

2.1. Attack Graph Models
There are a number of different styles of attack
graphs. A very popular attack graph is the attack tree.

In general, attack trees are directed and acyclic graphs.
They express how a specific sequence of attack steps
can lead to a system breach. The root node of an attack
tree represents the goal of the attacker, and the
branches in the tree show the different paths to achieve
the goal. The steps to achieve the attack are
represented by leaves [2]. Once the graph is built, the
probability of achieving an attack can be assigned to
nodes or links, and the overall probability of reaching
the goal can be found. Attack trees can assess risk to
static probabilistic models, time dependent dynamic
models, or both [2]. Using the assigned probabilities,
the paths with the highest expectation of success can be
identified and mitigation strategies can be considered.
Attack trees have been used in a variety of fields to
represent security risk and vulnerabilities. The term
attack tree was first popularized by Bruce Schneier
[53]. They are graphs such that nodes depict attacks
and links depict the steps to the goal. The root node is
considered to be the goal of the attacker and children
of the root are steps needed to achieve this goal. The
leafs of the attack tree represent attacks that can no
longer be cultivated [48]. Notable application of graphbased attack models include security analysis of
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems, voting systems, vehicular communication
systems, Internet related attacks, and secure software
engineering [9].
Alhomidi and Reed [7] used attack graph modeling
combined with genetic algorithms to identify the most
important security threats on a network. Chen [42]
presented a value driven approach to threat modeling
based on attack path analysis by introducing
stakeholder incentives into commercial off-the-shelf,
product vulnerability prioritization.
Kotenko and Chechulin [15] note the major
drawback of large attack graphs is computational
complexity, and described attack modeling and impact
assessment solutions focused on development of attack
graph construction and analysis for systems operating
in near real-time. Phillips and Swiler [54] state a
network-vulnerability risk identification system should
be capable of modeling the dynamic conditions of a
network. These conditions include the ability of the
attacker, concurrent events or attacks, user access
controls, and the sequences of attacks that depend on
time. Their method uses graph algorithms such as
shortest-path to recognize the attack paths with the
highest risk.
Louthan et al. [10] describe an approach to
modeling hybrid systems, such as programmed control
systems and cyber physical systems, that interact with
the physical world. Their method used what they term
a hybrid attack graph. The hybrid attack graph shows a
combined prospective of the space between
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information systems and a restricted but useful set of
hybrid systems that are at risk. Florian et al. [2] state
the assets and amount of time available to the attacker
and the stepwise execution of complementary attack
steps are the central aspects for an attacker in a
sophisticated attack. Based on these observations, their
paper extends dynamic attack tree models using the
ordered parallel behavior of AND-and OR-gates. Vigo
et al. [14] proposed an automated attack tree generator
using a static analysis approach. The attack trees are
automatically inferred from a process of algebraic
specification and Satisfiability Modulo Theories in a
syntax-directed fashion while avoiding exponential
explosion. Their case study used the standard
propositional denotation of an attack tree to phrase
quantitative problems.
Piètre-Cambacédès et al. [33] note that attack trees
are intrinsically static and limited to events that occur
independently of each other. They suggest a similar
structure based on Boolean logic Driven Markov
Processes. This is similar to attack tree models but
avoid combinatorial explosions. Roy et al. [34]
presented a novel attack tree they refer to as attack
countermeasure trees. In their model, defense measures
can be posed not only at the leaves of a tree, but any
node of the tree. Kordy et al. [31] demonstrated the
similarities between attack trees and game theory.
They showed attack–defense trees and binary zero-sum
two-player extensive form games have proportionate
expressive power such that they can be transformed
into one another and still preserve the result and
architecture.
Attack-defense trees are extensions of attack trees.
An attack-defense tree has the same attributes as an
attack tree, but also contains defense strategies. Nodes
are given characteristics, such as probability, impact,
and penalty. This is done in order to enhance the
expressive capability of the model. The values of the
characteristics are determined based on cognitive
assessment and historical events [19].
Kordy et al. [22] compared the computational
complexity of attack trees versus attack-defense trees.
They identified rules for which extending attack trees
did not increase computational complexity. Bagnato et
al. [19] also used attack-defense trees, which focus on
how attackers and defenders relate, to identify risk to
an RFID system in a case study. Based on their model,
they were able to identify guidelines to adhere to when
using similar strategies.

2.2 Risks for Medical Devices
There has also been considerable research in the risk
associated with medical devices posed by attackers.
Among such devices are implantable medical devices.

These devices have become increasingly popular and
many are equipped with wireless communications
which make them prime targets for attackers [32]. In
the article, Researchers fight to keep implanted
medical devices safe from hackers, Leavitt [32] notes
that over two million people in the US have an
implantable medical device. Many of these devices
communicate using wireless capability. Also noted in
the article were the researchers from Harvard
University, University of Massachusetts Amherst, and
University of Washington who were able to hijack the
short-range signals that an implantable cardiac
defibrillator sent to a legitimate independent controller
and caused it to emit a shock capable of inducing a
fatal heart rhythm [32].
Arney et al. [26] state that adversaries who attack
medical devices can be classified into two categories,
active and passive. Active adversaries have the ability
to spy on communications among devices, network
controllers and supervisors. They are then able to insert
messages, spoof, and damage the integrity of the
device. The second type of adversaries, passive,
eavesdrop for the purposes of acquiring private data
stored in a device. They also note four classes of
targets that adversaries attack within medical device
systems: patient physical security, patient data
security (privacy), medical device physical security,
and data security of the health-care institution that
deploys the device [26].
Table 1. IEEE 802.15.6 Communication [38]
Implant to Implant
402-405 MHz
Implant
to
Body 402-405 MHz
Surface
Implant to External
402-405 MHz
Body Surface to Body 13.5, 50, 400, 600, 900
Surface (LOS)
MHz, 2.4, 3.1 - 10.6
GHz
Body Surface to Body 13.5, 50, 400, 600, 900
Surface (NLOS)
MHz, 2.4, 3.1 - 10.6
GHz
Body
Surface
to 13.5, 50, 400, 600, 900
External (LOS)
MHz, 2.4, 3.1 - 10.6
GHz
Body
Surface
to 13.5, 50, 400, 600, 900
External (NLOS)
MHz, 2.4, 3.1 - 10.6
GHz
Burleson et al. [20] note that threat modeling is vital
to assessing the security vulnerabilities to medical
devices, and the risk posed by the vulnerabilities varies
along with the nature of the data or the ramification of
actuation. Radcliffe [39] was able to reverse engineer
an insulin pump’s packet structure. His research
showed the insulin pump did not encrypt the medical
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data it transmitted and did not authenticate the
components that were communicating. Li [27] was
able to take control of an insulin pump, including the
ability to terminate transmission of insulin or inject
large amounts of insulin, and suggested mitigation
strategies using rolling-code cryptographic protocols
and body-coupled communication.
Xu [5] created an automated attack trees generator
for implantable medical devices using process
modeling and hazard analysis. He also demonstrated its
use on Patient Controlled Analgesia, which is used for
delivering pain medication to patients in hospitals.
Rushanan and Kune [12]note the security of the
telemetry interface on implantable medical devices has
received much attention in the academic community,
but the risk of software exploitation and the sensor
interface layer requires further research. Rostami et al.
[18] describe the challenge in securing medical
devices, including inability to use common approaches
such as passwords and certificates because
practitioners would not have access to the device in an
emergency setting, and implantable medical devices
are limited in power consumption and computational
capability, which limits security strategies. As stated,
the intention of their paper was to stimulate further
research in the areas of implantable medical device
security and medical-device security in general.

devices to display collected data, devices to perform
calculations, devices to administer medication, and
devices to store the collected data. IEEE 802.15 is
concerned with the development of agreeable standards
for Personal Area Networks or short distance wireless
networks. It addresses wireless networking of
ambulatory computing devices such as PCs, cell
phones, and consumer electronics [18]. The IEEE
standard 802.15.6 is the latest standard for wireless
body area networks. This standard specifies short range
wireless communication inside or on the human body
[28]. However, several security problems have been
noted [4], and communication can be achieved in a
variety of ways, including ZigBee, Bluetooth, internet,
WIMAX, RF, Volte, and 2, 3, or 4G mobile telephone
networks [30, 47, 49]. Wireless body area networks
function in either a one-hop or two-hop star topology
[35]. Table 1 – IEEE 802.15.6 Communication
describes the various communication channels laid out
by IEEE 802.15.6.
The IEEE 802.15.6 standard identifies a security
paradigm for wireless body area networks that defines
three levels of security [37]:
1. Unsecured Communication - Data transmitted in
unsecured frames. Provides no measure for
integrity, validation, authenticity, replay defense,
privacy, and confidentiality.
2. Authentication/ no Encryption- Data that is
transmitted is authenticated but not encrypted.
3. Authentication/ Encryption- Data transmitted is
authenticated and encrypted.
All devices in a wireless body area network fall into
one of these three categories.
A significant amount of research has been
conducted on attack graphs and risks to medical
devices and body area networks. This research
suggests combining the two to assess risk to
ambulatory medical devices and form mitigation
strategies.

3. Data and Model
Figure 1. Hypothetical Network

2.3 Wireless Body Area Network
Ambulatory devices can be a single unit that may
or may not transmit data, or they can be one of many
devices that make up a wireless body area network
(WBAN). Body area networks are localized wireless
networks that have the ability to support a wide variety
of medical devices [28]. A wireless body area network
can consist of devices to monitor physiological data,

In order to display the use of attack graphs and
form mitigation strategies, this research uses a model
of a theoretical ambulatory device as seen in Figure 1 –
Hypothetical Wireless body Network. The model is
referred to as theoretical because it is currently in
production and, therefore, not yet available for proper
testing. The device is a wireless body network that
consist of three sensors. Two sensors are worn on the
head and one sensor is worn on the chest. These types
of sensors are commercially available, and capable of
monitoring various biological data, including heart
rate, EEG signals, or body temperature. The sensors
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communicate through a wireless signal to a cellular
smart phone which runs an application that processes,
analyzes, and stores the data.
Table 2. Bluetooth Attacks and Mitigation
Author
Attack
Mitigation Strategy
Padgette /
Minar [41]
[24]
Minar [24]

Capture
Bluetooth
device address
BluePrinting

Minar
[24]
Padgette
[41]

Reflection
attack
Repeatable
authentication
attempts
Blueover

Set device to lowest
power level

Padgette
[41]
Padgette /
Minar [41]
[24]
Padgette /
Dardanelli
[41]
Minar /
Panse
[24] [25]
Minar /
Panse
[24] [25]
Minar
[24]

Static SSP pass
keys
Encryption key
negotiable.

Keep device address
secret
Use encryption, Keep
device address secret
Limit authentication
request, Set device to
lowest power
Keep device address
secret
Random, passkeys at
each pairing
Full 128 bit key,
establish min key size

No
authentication

Application level
security

Bluesnarfing

non-discover mode

Pin Cracking

Use random long pin
codes

MIM/Imperson
ation Attack

Minar
[24]

Pairing
Eavesdropping

Link encryption, Link
keys based on
combination keys,
Security mode 3, Set
device to lowest power
Pair as little as possible,
Link encryption, Set
device to lowest power

Minar [24]

The application allocates a specific amount of
memory for data storage and uploads the data to cloud
storage when needed. Doctors have access to the cloud
storage for data analysis. The application analyzes the
data and, if an anomaly occurs, it sends a text message
to the patient and patient’s emergency contact as well
as an email to the patient’s doctor. Due to industry
popularity [1], the scope of this research focuses on a
smartphone running an Android Operating System that
utilizes Bluetooth to communicate with the sensors.
Bluetooth is a short range (10-100m) low power
wireless technology that operates from 2.4 to 2.4835
GHz at a data rate of 1, 2, or 3 Mbps [6]. Three basic
security services provided in the Bluetooth standard
and identified in a National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) guide include authentication,

confidentiality and authorization [41]. The report
defines authentication as the ability to identify
communicating devices through a unique device
address. The report notes that the Bluetooth standard
does not support user authentication natively.
Confidentiality focuses on averting the compromise of
information by ensuring that only authorized devices
have access to transmitted data. Authorization
concentrates on resource governance based on device
authorization prior to sanctioning interaction.
In general, Bluetooth security threats can be
grouped into three categories that include disclosure,
integrity and denial. A disclosure threat occurs when
information is leaked from the system, an integrity
threat is when an attacker deliberately alters data to
fool the receiver and a denial of service threat occurs
when an attacker is able to limit a user’s access to a
device or application [57]. This research focuses on
data acquisition and/or manipulation. A literature
review was performed to identify appropriate attack
strategies on individual vectors in the theoretical
model. Table 2 – Bluetooth Attacks and Mitigation
summarizes attacks and provides mitigation strategies
when available on Bluetooth enabled devices, and
Table 3 – Android Attacks and Mitigation provides
attacks and mitigation strategies on devices running an
Android operating system. In both tables the first
column lists the author and reference. The second
column gives the title or style of an attack and the last
column provides a of list possible mitigation strategies.
This research assumes attackers are capable enough
to acquire information regarding communication
frequency and modulation. This information is,
generally, easily found in an online copy of a device’s
user manual or by searching for the specific device on
the Federal Communication Commission website.
Therefore, the reconnaissance steps are omitted in the
model.
Table 3. Android Attacks and Mitigation
Author
Attack
Mitigation
Strategy
Vidas [29]

Physical Attack

User Authentication

Vidas / Enck
[29] [21]
Chen [8]

Permission
Model Attack
UI State
Inference
Attacks
Man In The
Middle
General

App certified

Noor [17]
Oli [11]

Dondyk [65]

Denial of
Service

File System Access
Control, Buffer
Reuse
Encryption, No
default password
No automatic
connection to Wi-Fi,
Disable Wi-Fi when
not in use
Disable Wi-Fi when
not in use
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4. Attack Graphs

Figure 2. Attack Graph
An inherent difficulty with attack graph modeling
is assigning weights to the edges of the graph [45].
Specifically, what method does one us to assign a
numerical value to an attack that cannot be
quantitatively assessed? This research presents an
alternative approach to assigning weights to links in
the graph. The graph, as seen in Figure 2 - Bluetooth
Attack Graph, assigns a numerical value to nodes. This
value represents the likelihood of achieving success in
a given node. By adding the value of each node in the
path and dividing by the number of nodes traversed in
the path, an ‘average’ risk is assigned for the attack.
Node risks are assigned based on the following
concepts:

Monotonicity as stated by Amman et al “means
that no action an attacker takes interferes with the
attacker’s ability to take any other action” [52].
Hence, any calculations derived from the attacks
must consider all attack vectors.
2. The frequency concept simply means that
increased recurrence is displayed via increased
node weight [45]. Nodes that are visited more
often are given higher risk. This is not because it is
easily achieved, but because it is a vital step to
many different attacks.
3. Complexity refers to the difficulty of an attack.
For example, BlueSnarfing is described in
literature as “the software tools required to steal
information from Bluetooth enabled mobile
phones (that) are widely available in the Web”
[24], therefore an “equipment” node would be
assigned a higher weight because it is easily
achieved.
Figure 2 is an example attack graph on the
theoretical device. Here, the goal of the attacker is data
acquisition. Blueover is an attack used to acquire
sensitive or private data from a mobile device equipped
with Bluetooth. Reflection attacks are a type of ‘man in
the middle attack’ against Bluetooth enabled devices.
‘Access AT Comm’ refers to an attacker having access
to the address translation command. ‘Get Dev Address’
refers to the ability to get the Bluetooth device address,
and ‘No Encryption’ means the communication
between devices is not encrypted. ‘AT Set Available’
means the mode of address translation command is set
to available. Finally, physical refers to an attack where
an attacker gets physical access to a device, and social
engineering is when the attacker uses methods such as
phishing to get the needed information. Attacks were
selected from those in tables 2 and 3.
The attack graph depicted in Figure 2 highlights
two types of attacks, Blueover and reflection. Blueover
requires two initial steps for success. The first is ‘Get
Device Address’, and the second is ‘Access AT
Comm’. The symbol on the graph connecting the two
links is an ‘And’ symbol, which means both must be
achieved. The next step for ‘Access AT Comm’ is ‘AT
set Available’, which means the mode of the address
translation must be set too available.
The next step requires either a physical attack or
social engineering to achieve the goal of data
acquisition. The two initial steps for a reflection attack
are ‘Get Device Address’ and ‘No Encryption’. Once
this has taken place, either a physical attack or a social
engineering attack can be instigated.
By modeling attacks in this manner, it is easy to
identify the most important security issues. For
example, most paths eventually go through social
engineering or physical nodes as depicted in Figure 2.
1.
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For the purposes of this discussion, the attack nodes
illustrated in Figure 2 are considered a moderate risk.
While the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
suggests actions that manufacturers should consider in
order to secure medical devices such as "Limiting
access to devices to trusted users through the use of
authentication, such as ID and password, smart card
and biometrics, including multi-layered authentication"
[13], the guidance is only a recommendation and does
not establish legally enforceable responsibilities.
It is reasonable to assume administrators will
attempt to hold medical devices, which reside in a
hospital setting, to the guidelines that are set forth by
the FDA. However, such an assumption should not be
made for third party software that runs on devices such
as mobile phones.
Another consideration is that ambulatory devices
could have suggested authentication protocols;
however, there is no guarantee that users who do not
understand the possible risk will enable authentication,
or use reasonable passwords to protect devices. Since
these risk are considered moderate, it would be a good
idea to educate patients on the dangers associated with
these types of attacks along with how to avoid them.
Another node frequently visited is ‘Get Dev Add’,
which stands for Get the Bluetooth Device Address.
Hence, it would be a good idea for patients to ensure
that the Bluetooth Device Address stays concealed.
Table 4 - Blueover Possible Paths presents a list of
the possible attack paths for a Blueover attack. The
table only depicts attacks that could lead to success.
For example, both ‘Access AT Command’ and ‘Get
Device Address’ must be achieved. In any case where
one of these attacks fails, the probability of success is
zero. Therefore, those attacks are not listed. This
indicates that mitigation strategies relating to those
nodes should be top priority. An analysis of the table
data indicates that the probability of the success of an
attack is reduced or increased by removing the threat to
any individual node corresponding to an ‘or’ gate.
The logic for Tables 4 and 5 are derived via the
following calculation. Each row in the table has an S
followed by a number. The S stands for success while
the number is the assigned weight from the node. If all
of the attacks are successful, the weighted impact totals
eight. If an attack is not achieved, the S is turned into
an F (for failure) and the weight is assigned a zero to
reduce the likelihood of achieving the overall attack
goal. The total possible value in both tables is eight.
This value represents the value of treating every node
as a success and summing the values. The probabilities
between the tables appear to correspond, but table 5
has one less intermittent step (‘AT Set Available’).

Table 4. Blueover Possible Paths
Access
AT
Comm

Get
Dev
Add

AT
Set
Aval

P

Soc

Norm

Goal

S-1

S-2

S-2

S-1

S-2

8/8

100%

S-1

S-2

S-2

S-1

F-0

6/8

75%

S-1

S-2

S-2

F-0

S-2

7/8

87%

S-1

S-2

F-0

S-1

S-2

6/8

75%

S-1

S-2

F-0

S-1

F-0

4/8

50%

S-1

S-2

F-0

F-0

S-2

5/8

63%

Key: S=Success, F=Failure, P=Physical Attack, Soc=
Social Engineering, Norm=Actual/Potential, Goal=
Probability of success if given steps are achieved.

Table 5 - Reflection Attack Possible Paths shows
the possible attack paths for a Reflection attack. Again,
‘No Encryption’ and ‘Get Device Address’ are both
required for success, so only paths with attacks that are
successful are shown. The evaluation of this table
indicates that social engineering attacks should be
addressed before physical attacks. This is due to a
higher probability of achieving the attack goal is higher
for social engineering versus a physical attack.
Viewing both tables together gives further insight
into common attack vectors. For example, the node
‘Get Device Address’ is required in both attacks. ‘Get
Device Address’ refers to the ability to get the
Bluetooth device address. Since this attack goal is
pursued in two different attack types, all Bluetooth
device users should take steps to keep device addresses
secret. Evaluations should also take into account the
attack paths.
Table 5. Reflection Attack Possible Paths
No
Encryption

Get
Dev
Add.

S-3

S-2

S-3
S-3

P

Soc

Norm

Goal

S-1

S-2

8/8

100%

S-2

S-1

F-0

6/8

75%

S-2

F-0

S-2

7/8

87%

Key: S=Success, F=Failure, P=Physical Attack, Soc=
Social Engineering, Norm=Actual/Potential, Goal=
Probability of success if given steps are achieved.
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Reviewers should consider the number of steps in
a path. In most cases one would assume a shorter path
is easier to achieve. However, the correspondence
between the probabilities on the tables for particular
paths is also due to the ‘No Encryption’ node. The ‘No
Encryption’ node has a very high risk value, which
offsets the fact that the attack has fewer steps. In any
case, producing attack graphs and the corresponding
attack path tables provides detailed insight on the
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation strategies within
a system.
These models highlight the need to assess risk to
ambulatory medical devices independently of
traditional medical devices. Vulnerabilities such as
physical access and social engineering would have less
probability of success for traditional medical devices
for various reasons. Traditional devices in a hospital
setting are generally monitored by the hospital staff,
making the success of a physical attack less likely.
Hospital personnel receive training on the use and
maintenance of medical devices, making them less
likely to fall victim to a social engineering attack.
Devices in hospital settings are generally ‘hard wired’
or they are on a private network. In addition, many
devices use proprietary software. This makes threats
such as ‘Access AT Comm’ less likely, if not
impossible.

5. Conclusion and Future Work
Ambulatory medical devices offer a viable
alternative for patients who require constant
monitoring. These devices provide a means for
administering medication, monitoring vital signs, and
improving a patient’s overall quality of life. However,
as with any technology, it is important to understand
the risk associated with the use of these devices. This is
especially important for ambulatory medical devices,
which can have direct or indirect impact on a patient’s
health and wellbeing.
Attack graphs offer a visual approach to identifying
risk within complex systems. The steps required to
achieve an attack are easily identifiable using this
approach. Hence, the identification of attacks aids
designers in developing mitigation strategies to prevent
the successful execution of an attack.
This research demonstrates attack graph modeling
on a theoretical ambulatory medical device. The
theoretical device contains components and software
that is common among ambulatory devices today. This
research highlights the need to model ambulatory
devices separately from traditional medical devices by
demonstrating certain attack vectors that pose greater
risk to ambulatory devices, such as physical attacks

and social engineering. To our knowledge, this is the
first time attack graph modeling has been used for
ambulatory medical devices.
Additional future work will consider the
architecture of the attack graph. In this research,
weights were assigned to the nodes of the graph.
Future work will examine the impact of assigning
weights to the links between nodes along with
developing combined weighting systems in order to
identify which style of attack graph is the most
appropriate for ambulatory medical devices. Once
modeling is complete, mitigation strategies will be
identified and tested.
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